

The National Coordinator for Security
and Counterterrorism (NCTV¹) in The Netherlands
Ministry of Security and Justice



National Coordinator for Security and
Counterterrorism
Ministry of Security and Justice

(NCTV, 2016)

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¹ NCTV: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisme Bestrijding, Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (NCTV, 2016).

Mr. Dick Schoof is the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism in the Netherlands, and heads the NCTV organization from March 1, 2013. (NCTV, 2016) Mr. Schoof is responsible for Cyber-Security, Counterterrorism, as well as Crisis Management. (NCTV, 2016)



(Volkskrant, 2016)

Original script:

“Niet eerder zijn er zoveel aanslagen gepleegd op Westerse bodem als afgelopen jaar. Toch handhaaft de NCTV het huidige dreigingsniveau ‘substantieel’. Zorgen zijn er wel: over de complexer wordende terreurdreiging en de toename van geweld rond het asieldebat over ons eigen land. Dat maakt de Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid vandaag bekend. Het is voor het eerst sinds de aanslagen in Parijs dat de coördinator met een nieuw “Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland” komt. De kans op een aanslag is nog steeds ‘reëel’. Maar het niveau gaat pas naar kritiek wanneer er concrete plannen zijn voor een aanslag in of tegen ons land.” (Buitenland.Eenvandaag, 2016).

Translation by Kevin Suleiman:

Never before have so many attacks been committed on Western soil as last year. Yet, the NCTV utilizes the current level of threat ‘substantial’. However, there are concerns: about the increasing complexity of terrorism, and the use of violence regarding the asylum-debate in our own country (The Netherlands). That is announced today by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism. It is the first time since the attacks in Paris that the National Coordinator projects a new ‘Assessment of Terrorism in The Netherlands’. The chance for an attack is still ‘real’. However, the level of threat only proceeds to critical when there are concrete plans for an attack in, or against our country (Buitenland.Eenvandaag, 2016).

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	4
The NCTV's Domestic War on Terror.....	6
Appendixes	12
Bibliography.....	13

Introduction

The first-year International Public Management (IPM) students at The Hague University of Applied Sciences (THUAS) conducted an excursion to the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism in The Netherlands (NCTV) on Tuesday 31st of May 2016 in The Hague (NCTV, 2016).

In preparation for the excursion, the IPM students were obliged to read and analyse four documents² about the organization and objectives of the NCTV, in order to sufficiently comprehend what type of organization the NCTV is, and what role it fulfils in the Netherlands. Additionally, the IPM students were required to prepare questions which could assist them in the essay that they must write for this assignment.

In this assignment, the IPM student essentially is assigned the role of an IPM researcher, who has studied the NCTV. Moreover, the IPM student has prepared questions for the excursion to the NCTV, and during the research visit the student received answers for his prepared questions, and may note the other questions that were asked by other IPM students.

Subsequently, the IPM student is asked to write an essay on the NCTV, in which the student essentially analysis and evaluates the necessity of the NCTV organization. Moreover, the IPM student should base his personal ideas on the data read and analysed, and subsequently explain to the reader if the NCTV has to be modified, stay as it is, or dismantled. Additionally, the IPM student must specify the course of actions that must lead to the intended result, and may provide suggestions.

Here it is vital that the essay does not solely project the individual opinion and recommendations of the student, but provides a spectrum of views and opinions on the topic in the national, International, and/or academic community. Therefore, the student has to conduct desk research, and collect reliable academic sources and literature, which one can use to project the variety of opinions on the NCTV.

² Four documents provided by IPM programme: 1) Crisis and Disaster management in the Netherlands, 2014: a description of structures and processes (Kuipers & Boin, 2014); 2) National Manual on Decision-Making in Crisis-Situations – The Netherlands (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism - Ministry of Security and Justice , 2013); 3) International Disaster Response (Beerens, Duyvis, & Tonnaer, 2013); 4) The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism: overview of measures and actions (NCTV, 2014)

“Terrorism continues to rise, with over 32,000 people killed in terrorist attacks in 2014, the highest number recorded. Despite being highly concentrated in five countries, terrorism is spreading, with more countries recording attacks and deaths”

(Vision of Humanity, 2015)

The NCTV's Domestic War on Terror

The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV)³ aims to safeguard The Netherlands from threats that may disturb the Dutch society (NCTV, 2016). In order to ensure the national security and protect the vital infrastructure of the Netherlands, the NCTV closely cooperates with its partners within the government, the academic community - including researchers, and the private sector in the Netherlands. (NCTV, 2016) Essentially, the Dutch government attempts to work more effective and efficiently, by assigning various core-tasks⁴ to one sole organization. Here, the NCTV functions as a platform where various partners can exchange their expertise and recommendations. Subsequently, the NCTV can analyse and give meaning to the gathered information from the parties, and map the threats and challenges in the Netherlands. One can argue that this provides the NCTV with a unique privileged position, as they have access to a substantial amount of data and expertise from various partners, and subsequently utilize this data to provide reliable and effective reports and action-plans to manage and anticipate on domestic issues and challenges (NCTV, 2016).

The NCTV does face many national and international challenges, and the significant rise of terrorist attacks in Western Europe can be considered as one of the major threats to The Netherlands. (NCTV - Ministry of Security and Justice , 2016) Additionally, according to the Global Terrorism Index 2015⁵ there were 32.685 terrorism-related casualties in 2014, and this is the highest number ever obtained with an increase of approximately 80% compared to 2013 (Vision of Humanity, 2015). According to the index, the 5 countries that bear the brunt of 78% terrorism-related deaths in 2014, are in subsequent order: Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015) Here, one could argue that there is a parallel between these countries, as they in various degrees and dimensions suffer from, extremism, whether ideological or religious (terrorist groups) who commit attacks on the civilian population or against government institutions, in order to obtain their political and/or ideological objectives (Azumah, 2015). Moreover, one could perceive an interconnected sectarian and/or ethnic and/or religious red thread within this chain of terrorist attacks, as embodied in the hostility between Sunni and Shia Muslims, Christians, Hindus, and other (minority) groups (Siddiqi, 2012). Here, it is vital to take into account that these hostilities and/or mobilization of terrorist-cells are not solely confined to the home-countries of these groups, but also within the diasporas and communities in Western European countries. (Victoroff, Adelman, & Matthews, 2012).

The relevance here is that the trends of increasing terrorist activities are problematic and inflict extensive danger, not only in the countries where these various (terrorist) groups as ISIL and Boko Haram (Vision of Humanity, 2015) are rooted, but also increasingly in other places around the world, as in Western Europe. Never have so many terrorist attacks (14) been perpetuated in Western Europe in one sole year as in 2016, according to the NCTV (NCTV, 2016). Therefore, it is essential to analyse how the NCTV seeks to prevent terrorist attacks in the Netherlands, and what obstacles and challenges are faced by the NCTV in the war on terror.

³ The NCTV is part of the Ministry of Security and Justice, and is rooted in its former predecessors that have been merged together: the former National Safety and Security Department; the National Coordinator for counterterrorism (NCTb); and the Government Computer Emergency Response Team (GOVCERT) (NCTV, 2016). The NCTV has approximately 300 employees, and it consists of five other complementary policy departments³, the National Crisis Centre (NCC), and the National Operations Coordination Centre (LOCC) (NCTV, 2016).

⁴ These core tasks are: analysing and reducing identified threats; providing surveillance and protection for individuals, property, services, events, and vital sectors; ensuring cyber security; making property, individuals, sectors and networks more resistant to threats, and ensuring effective crisis management and crisis communication (NCTV, 2016).

⁵ See appendix B for the map of the Global Terrorism Index 2015 (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015).

There are many conflicts around the world, and according to the NCTV the conflict in Syria has empowered jihadist groups within Europe (NCTV - Ministry of Security and Justice , 2016). Around 6000 people from Europe are fighting with ISIS (Kirk, 2016), and here it is important to note that a quarter from the jihadists that joined ISIS are from France and Belgium (Graham, 2016), while the Netherlands has approximately 220 jihadist who have joined ISIS (NCTV - Ministry of Security and Justice , 2016) The terrorist attacks in Paris on 30 November 2015, and in Brussel on 22 March 2016, illustrate that the terrorist group ISIS or individual jihadists, are able to conduct terrorism on European territory and inflict many civilian casualties (NOS, 2016). However, according to Mr. Jos de Jong⁶, the NCTV does not only anticipate on (jihadist) returnees from conflict zones, but equally seeks to prevent domestic radicalization, and if necessary take the appropriate actions to prevent these actors from organizing and/or committing attacks (Jong, NCTV Excursion - Speaker 3 , 2016). Here, one could argue that this multi-dimensional approach is essential, as these terrorist networks operate globally in transnational networks. These networks fulfil multiple roles, as funding of arms and equipment, but also recruitment by ideological and/or political manipulation and indoctrination. Consequently, this causes youngster in Europe to join terrorist organisations (Saikia & Stepanova, 2009).

According to the International Centre for Counter-terrorism, 30% of the Europeans who are fighting abroad with terrorist organisations such as ISIS, returns back to Europe (Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016) Mr. Jos de Jong (speaker number 3 on the NCTV Excursion) stated that the NCTV utilizes much resources and expertise into monitoring these returnees, as they pose great danger for the security in the Netherlands (Jong, NCTV Excursion - Speaker 3 , 2016). One asked him if a Dutch citizen who travelled to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq to fight against ISIS – the enemy of the Netherlands – was still considered a threat for the national security. Mr. de Jong explained that besides the fact that it is illegal to fight with a foreign military force, one can never determine the intentions an individual has when returned. Therefore, it's essential to take precautionary actions (Jong, NCTV Excursion - Speaker 3 , 2016). Furthermore, according to the Dutch Public Prosecution Service⁷ every "combat action" is prosecutable, even when you fight against a terrorist organization (RTL Nieuws, 2016). Here, one can argue that it is indeed better to utilize a consistent policy, and prohibit people to commit combat actions without permission of the Dutch government. Especially, since it saves much work for the NCTV to monitor people, and determine if they have hazardous intentions and may pose a threat to the Netherlands (Jong, NCTV Excursion - Speaker 3 , 2016).

In addition, according to the lecture of Mr. de Jong (Jong, Radicalization and Counterterrorism, 2016) the NCTV attempts to bring all relevant government and non-government organizations together, in order to exchange expertise and recommendations. Essentially, the NCTV provides the mechanism for these parties to exchange data and expertise, and complementary fulfils a role of "coordinating leadership", (Jong, Radicalization and Counterterrorism, 2016).

Additionally, Mr. de Jong stated in his lecture that the NCTV uses a "tailor-made approach", and seeks to connect and exchange data on a local, national and international level, with governmental as well as non-governmental actors (Jong, Radicalization and Counterterrorism, 2016). The intensifying globalization process provides more opportunities for terrorists to travel, and sustain their covert transnational networks of funding and capital, as well as human resources (Demir & Verlik, 2015). Therefore, the NCTV and its partners exchange information about high-risk individuals and networks with various International intelligence organizations (AIVD, 2016).

⁶ Mr. Jos de Jong is a former Dutch marine and now works for the NCTV, specialized in counterterrorism. He explicitly asked the interviewer to refrain from quoting certain parts of the interview, but rather explain what he said according to judicious interpretation and analysis. However, one is allowed to quote the lecture he provided about Radicalization and Counterterrorism.

⁷ Openbaar Ministerie – Public Prosecution Service (OM, 2016)

According to the Dutch Commission for Intelligence and Safety, the cooperation with the US in monitoring individuals in the Netherlands, has at least prevented one terrorist attack in The Netherlands (Klompener, 2015). This example illustrates that it is vital to exchange data on terrorist threats on a global level, as terrorists operate in covert transnational networks, and therefore pose an extensive threat (Saikia & Stepanova, 2009).

Based on the intelligence the NCTV collects and analyses from its partners, they attempt to determine the risk-level of The Netherlands. Consequently, the NCTV attempts to anticipate on certain attacks or situations, in order to improve the resilience of Dutch crisis management in general (NCTV, 2016). According to researchers in the Netherlands, the NCTV is vital, because it coordinates and cooperates with various agencies, which each have their own expertise, responsibilities, and authority (Kuipers & Boin, 2014). In fact, one could argue that this inclusive approach is essential, because it takes into account various perspectives and recommendations of partners and expertise-institutions. Consequently, the suggestions and expertise's are merged together, devising a solid decisive strategy (NCTV - Ministry of Security and Justice , 2016).

The current level of threat projected by the NCTV is "Substantial", which implies that there is a real chance of a terrorist attack in The Netherlands (NCTV, 2016). Therefore, the NCTV utilizes various preventive and repressive strategies. This multi-dimensional approach is essential to prevent terrorist attacks in the Netherlands (Zaretsky, 2016). One of these is the action Programme Integrated Approach Jihadism, which aims to protect the democracy and rule of law, to combat and weaken domestic jihadist movements, and to counter the breeding ground for radicalization in the Netherlands (NCTV, 2014). Here, one could state that it is indeed vital to focus on preventive measures for the long-term, as these might pull the roots of radicalization, and thus structurally prevent people to radicalize (Kouwenhoven & Smithuijsen, 2016).

The "Schilderswijk", a multicultural neighbourhood in The Hague in the Netherlands, has provided almost 25% of the Dutch jihadists (Kouwenhoven & Smithuijsen, 2016). A long time the neighbourhood was plagued with riots, by mostly unemployed and/or uneducated youth that propagated terrorist organizations like ISIS and Al Qaeda. The Municipality in The Hague stated that their anti-radicalization policy has proven to be effective, as there are less demonstrations and riots, and the overall atmosphere in the neighbourhood has improved. Moreover, the taboo around subjects like jihadism and ISIS is penetrated, and there is more transparency and exchange between the parents and youth, and the various neighbourhood-coaches, police, and support-agencies. (Kouwenhoven & Smithuijsen, 2016).

One attempts to emphasize here that The Hague Municipality utilized a balanced multi-dimensional approach: hard measures for hard-core jihadists who were determined in their ideology and objectives, and a subtler soft approach for those youngster that were confused and seeking meaning in their lives (Kouwenhoven & Smithuijsen, 2016). This illustrates and affirms that the judicious approach the NCTV utilizes and advises is proving effective, especially emphasizing the "tailor made" approach (NCTV, 2014).

In contrast, youth Imam Yassin Elforkani has predicted that within 16 months there will be a terrorist attack in Amsterdam, if the government does not respond decisively against the covert terrorist-networks that have emerged in the last few years (Borst, 2016). One could argue that this undermines the efforts and strategies that the NCTV in cooperation with other partners conducts in order to prevent such attacks. Furthermore, according to Mr. Elforkani many people in the problematic neighbourhoods don't cooperate with the local or national organizations, and instead protect these radicalized people. Here it is vital to note there is a parallel with the Belgium neighbourhood Molenbeek, which collectively protected Salah Abdeslam, who has been accused and charged for being an accomplice in the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 (Ludeker, Dahhan, Koch, & Jager, 2016) (BBC, 2016). These concrete examples illustrate the obstacles and challenges that the NCTV might face, as radicalization takes place covertly, and as radicalized people – even alleged terrorists – are protected by the communities they reside in. Here the NCTV might face the dilemma of penetrating the "wall" that hides and protects radicalized individuals (Ludeker, Dahhan, Koch, & Jager, 2016).

Therefore, one could suggest that the NCTV must attempt to build and/or strengthen the relationships between the local communities and various relevant agencies such as the police and municipality, in order to stimulate the trust and support of the population for data-exchange with government institutions, especially when the national security might be at risk. This may include field-work, and municipality and/or NCTV employees who go through the (problematic) neighbourhoods and start dialogue with people about what is empowering grievances, e.g. discrimination, stigmatization, and unfair treatment by police/security forces (Lyons-Padilla, Gelfand, Mirahmadi, Farooq, & Egmond, 2015). Consequently, the NCTV can integrate these issues in their advisory reports, and provide specific policies and measures which target the root causes of these grievances, which essentially create the fertile foundation for radicalization (Lyons-Padilla, Gelfand, Mirahmadi, Farooq, & Egmond, 2015).

According to Mr. Edwin Bakker⁸ the high quality analytical threat-reports that the NCTV produces each quarter annually, are solid and reliable, and provide local authorities with much adhesion in their attempt to monitor and counter jihadist threats (Versteegh, 2015). Besides the effective functioning of the NCTV, there is also some critique. According to Mr. Bakker, the politically-loaded programmes such as the “Programme Integrated Approach Jihadism” may restrict the professionals of the NCTV to operate from their own experience and expertise, because the programme is a long list with political demands (Versteegh, 2015). Moreover, Mr. Bakker also projects the critique that there is on Mr. Dick Schoof, as he initially used to keep distance from politics; however, now he seems to execute the wishes of the parliament (Versteegh, 2015).

Furthermore, Mr. Bakker states that there are multiple internal currents within the NCTV, and that therefore the tone of the official (press) statements might change from time to time, as the statements are sometimes to politically sensitive and/or loaded (Versteegh, 2015). An example here is that the NCTV stated that: “There is an enormous difference between Islam and Jihadism”. As a response to this statement, old VVD⁹-politician Frits Bolkestein, accused the NCTV to perform politics (Versteegh, 2015). Here, one may argue that it is indeed essential for the NCTV to remain a neutral and politically-objective organization, as this ensures the reliability and acceptance of the general population in the Netherlands (Luckham, R; Goetz, A.M; Kaldor, M, 2016).

However, one must also take into account that the NCTV functions under the ministry of Security and Justice, and certain political actors, such as ministers, might have an influence on the operations and strategies of the NCTV. Thus, total exclusion from politics is not realistic; however, the focus must always be on the legitimate common objective: to keep the Netherlands safe and secure, and prevent terrorist attacks (Luckham, R; Goetz, A.M; Kaldor, M, 2016).

The major critique of Mr. Bakker is that the NCTV continues to utilize four types¹⁰ of threat levels, which may be outdated and are not exact enough. Instead, Mr. Bakker suggests that one should analyse the nuanced high-quality threat reports, in order to determine the level of threat quarterly. According to Mr. Bakker it might also be an option to include a fifth level of threat, which provides an explicit distinction between the substantial and critical threat-level. Additionally, the NCTV should refer more to local organizations for interviews, instead of doing it solely. (Versteegh, 2015). Here one can presume that Mr. Bakker has the expertise to suggest modifications of the threat-levels that are utilized by the NCTV, in order to make it more flexible and adaptable for changes in the domestic issues that threaten the national security.

⁸ Mr. Edwin Bakker is professor in Terrorism and Counterterrorism at Leiden University, and director of the Institute of Security and Global Affairs in The Hague. (Universiteit Leiden, 2016)

⁹ The “Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie” (VVD) [translated: People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy] is a Economically Liberal Dutch political party (VVD, 2016).

¹⁰ Four types of threat levels: Minimal, Limited, Substantial and Critical (NCTV, 2016)

Another advantage of more detailed threat levels might also be that the population becomes more aware and responsive for changes in the domestic security-atmosphere, and therefore increasingly anticipates on certain issues. Moreover, here the population of the Netherlands can play an essential role as watch-dog, in neighbourhoods, schools, and on the work-floor, and provide alarming signals to the municipality, which subsequently can exchange this information with the relevant governmental partners such as the NCTV.

From another perspective, Ms. Ria Cats¹¹ states that Mr. Schoof performs very well in his position as the NCTV; however, the NCTV does not receive sufficient budget to conduct the activities that are necessary (Cats, 2016). Nevertheless, at the excursion one asked Mr. Willy Steenbakkers¹² whether the NCTV receives sufficient funding for its activities. Mr Steen Bakker responded: "It's not about the amount of the budget, but about how spending the budget Wiseley". (Steenbakkers, 2016) Here, one could argue that it is indeed essential for the NCTV to be pragmatic, and consider judiciously how to spend the available budget on certain issues, as one has to deal with limits and other variables that may affect the decision-making procedure (Steenbakkers, 2016).

Additionally, Mr. Steenbakkers stated that the NCTV always seeks to improve its functioning and is always willing to listen to feedback and recommendations from partners and agencies. Moreover, he stated that the NCTV has to improve its information management, as technology keeps evolving. According to Mr. Steenbakker the problem here is that there is an information overflow, and that the NCTV needs good people to analyse and particularly, give meaning to all this information gathered about high-risk individuals and groups. He called this: "duiding geven", which means in Dutch to provide a meaningful interpretation about something or someone (Steenbakkers, 2016). An example here is that someone called Muhammed who withdraws from social activities with friends and family, and is seen continuously praying at a mosque, is not automatically depressed or radicalizing. According to social scientists, it's vital not to marginalize, stigmatize, and judge those Muslims or individuals from any other particular religion, because that essentially empowers the exclusion of an individual by e.g. Islamophobia, and subsequently plants and empowers a seed for radicalization (lyons-padilla, gelfand, mirahmadi, farooq, & egmond, 2015).

One can perceive the dilemma for the NCTV and other agencies, as it sometimes might be difficult to determine what exactly drives someone to behave in a certain way. Especially, when that person feels excluded, and has no trust in government agencies due to a variety of reasons, e.g. stigmatization, and discrimination (lyons-padilla, gelfand, mirahmadi, farooq, & egmond, 2015). Here the expertise of social scientists and researchers must be more intensively utilized, as the NCTV has to deal with human behaviour which may be unpredictable, and therefore problematic to anticipate effective measures on. Furthermore, social scientists can provide the required knowledge about the complex human behaviour, which is essential for the NCTV and other security and/or intelligence agencies to determine and anticipate upon actions of high-risk individuals (Victoroff, Adelman, & Matthews, 2012).

Therefore, one might recommend the NCTV to include and exchange with – more than in already does- local actors and role-models in the strategy against radicalization, as these people can provide a bottom-up perspective. Subsequently the strategy devised by the NCTV includes a bottom-up approach perspective, which provides it with more legitimacy, but particularly is more likely to be effective. Moreover, it is understandable and actually appreciated that the NCTV needs to suggest to act decisively, as sometimes repressive measures have to be taken, in order to ensure the national security of the Netherlands (NCTV, 2016).

¹¹ Ms. Risa Cats is a political journalist for the financial daily newspaper in the Netherlands (Financieel Dagblad, 2016) .

¹² Mr Willy Steenbakkers works for the NCTV as the Senior Safety and Security Advisor at the Dutch National Crisis Centre (NCC) (Linked-In, 2016).

However, here it is essential for the NCTV to judiciously consider what strategies and/or interventions in cooperation with other governmental and local actors are appropriate, and respect the individual's rights. Especially in the case of radicalizing people, certain actions may only empower the vicious circle of radicalization and jihadism (Lyons-padilla, gelfand, mirahmadi, farooq, & egmond, 2015).

It is alarming that the NCTV is concerned about hard-core jihadists who return from Syria in the coming years, as they are more dangerous than the previous returnees, due to their experience and continuous fighting in war zones (NOS , 2016). Therefore, the NCTV seeks to analyse what the best procedure is to de-radicalize and re-integrate these returnees. Here the NCTV recommends the Dutch government to take decisive action directly when the jihadists are returned, because then they are most prone to change of their mind-set (NOS , 2016). Additionally, the NCTV has published a rapport¹³, explaining how to approach and supervise these returnees, regarding their psychological issues and ideological development (NCTV, 2016). This illustrates that the NCTV already utilizes the expertise of social scientists to prevent the intensification of radicalization, and primarily, to subtly de-radicalize individuals with "soft-power" (Steenbakkers, 2016).

The strategies used by the NCTV and its partners have proven effective, e.g. by the fact that there has not been a terrorist attack in The Netherlands, in the time-period that France and Brussel have faced extensive attacks. (Jong, NCTV Excursion - Speaker 3 , 2016). Moreover, The NCTV and its partners closely monitor the trends and movements of high-risk individuals and networks in the Netherlands. However, the focus here is on preventive measures, such as using local neighbourhood-coaches to monitor the behaviour of people, and create a foundation for dialogue and understanding, as Mr. de Jong called it "soft power". Furthermore, this soft power might be combined with the "tailor made" approach as Mr. de Jong called stated (Jong, Radicalization and Counterterrorism, 2016), as every individual and/or group is unique, and requires a specific approach to ensure successful intervention.


One can argue that preventive action in the-long term will bear its fruits, as opposite to repressive action that in certain cases may only empower the vicious circle of radicalization (Victoroff, Adelman, & Matthews, 2012). Therefore, one can recommend to find a middle ground, and judiciously consider certain interventions in an individual's live, as it might back-fire. One can presume that the professionals who work for the NCTV know very well how they should organize and improve their strategies and actions, yet it may be helpful to shed light from the perspective of an outsiders, especially those who are close to the target-group, as they can provide grassroots information.

One can conclude state that the NCTV fulfils a unique and vital role of coordinating leadership between various governmental and non-governmental parties and individuals. Considering the wide range of activities, strategies, and judicious multidimensional approach that the NCTV utilizes in their objective to ensure the national security of the Netherlands, and prevent terrorist attacks domestically, one can argue that it fulfils a vital role, and must therefore stay in place as part of the Ministry of Security and Justice. However, it is essential that the NCTV continuously keeps modifying their approaches and strategies, and remains flexible in their operations, because the domestic as well as the international threat of terrorism will most likely intensify in the coming years. Taking into consideration the threats that are faced domestically in the Netherlands, the actions and strategies of NCTV are essential to preserve the national security in the Netherlands, and prevent terrorist attacks. However, the NCTV cannot do this solely, and should empower the grassroots exchange of knowledge and recommendations of its target group: the ordinary people themselves.

¹³ Tille of report: Samenvatting 'De jihad beëindigd? 24 teruggekeerde Syriëgangers in beeld' (NCTV, 2016)


Appendixes

Appendix A: This diagram illustrates the organizational structure of the NCTV.



(NCTV, 2016)

Appendix B: This map of the Global Terrorism Index 2015, illustrates the impact of terrorist attacks in the world.



(Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015)

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